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ABSTRACT 
Static analysis of the Windows NT File System (NTFS) which is the standard and most 
commonly used file system could provide useful information for digital forensics. However, 
since the NTFS disk image records every event in the system, forensic tools need to process an 
enormous amount of information related to user / kernel environment, buffer overflows, trace 
conditions, network stack and other related subsystems. This leads to imperfect forensic tools 
that are practical for implementation but not comprehensive and effective. This research 
discusses the analysis technique to detect data hidden based on the internal structure of the NTFS 
file system in the boot sector. Further, it attempts to unearth the vulnerabilities of NTFS disk 
image and the weaknesses of the current forensic techniques. This paper argues that a 
comprehensive tool with improved techniques is warranted for a successful forensic analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
Digital forensics IS the SCIence of 
identifying, extracting, analyzing and 
presenting the digital evidence that has been 
stored in the digital electronic storage 
devices to be used in a court of law [1, 2, 3]. 
It attempts to provide full descriptions of a 
digital crime scene. In computer systems, the 
primary goals of digital forensic analysis are 
fivefold: i) to identify all the unwanted 
events that took place, ii) to ascertain their 
effect on the system, iii) to acquire the 
necessary evidence to support a lawsuit, iv) 
to prevent future incidents by detecting the 
malicious techniques used and v) to 
recogmze the incitement reasons and 
intendance of the attacker for future 
predictions [4]. The general component in 
digital forensic process are; acquisition, 
preservation, and analysis [5]. 
Digital electronic evidence could be 
described as the information and data of 
investigative value that are stored by an 
electric device, such evidence [6]. This 
research focuses on the third goal of 
acqumng the necessary evidence of 
intrusions that take place on a computer 
system. In particular, this paper investigates 
the digital forensic techniques that could be 
used to analyze and acquire evidences from 
the most commonly used file systems on 
computers, namely, Windows NT File 
System (NTFS). 
Today, NTFS file system is the basis of 
predominant operating systems in use, such 
as Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows 
Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, 
Windows Vista, Windows 7 and even in 
most free UNIX distributions [7, 8, 9]. 
Hence, attackers try to target on NTFS as 
this could result in affecting more computer 
uscrs. Another compelling reason for 
witnessing a strong relationship between 
computer crime and the NTFS file system is 
the lack of literature that unearth the 
vulnerabilities of NTFS and the weaknesses 
of the present digital forensic techniques 
[10]. This paper attempts to fill this gap by 
studying the techniques used in the analysis 
of the NTFS disk image. Our objectives are 
i) to explore the NTFS disk image structure 
and its vulnerabilities, ii) to investigate 
different commonly used digital forensic 
techniques such as signatures, data hiding, 
timestamp, etc. and their weaknesses, and 
iii) finally to suggest improvements in static 
analysis ofNTFS disk image. 
2. Research Methodology 
In order to achieve the above mentioned 
objectives of this research work, we 
conducted an empirical study using selected 
digital forensic tools that are predominantly 
used in practice. Several factors such as 
effectiveness, uniqueness and robustness in 
analyzing NTFS disk image were considered 
in selecting the tools / utilities required for 
this empirical study. Since each utility does 
some specific functionality, a collection of 
such tools were necessary to perform a 
comprehensive set of functionalities. Hence, 
the following forensic utilities / tools were 
adopted to conduct the experimental 
investigation in this research work: 
i) Disk imaging utilities such as dd [11] 
or dcfldd V1.3.4-1 [12] for 
obtaining sector-by-sector mIrror 
image of the disk; 
ii) Evidence collection using utilities 
such as Hexedit [13], Frhed 1.4.0[14] 
and Strings V2.41[15] to introspect 
the binary code of the NTFS disk 
image; 
iii) NTFS disk analysis using software 
tools such as The Sleuth KIT (TSK) 
3.0] [16] and Autopsy [17] and 
NTFSINFO v1.0 [18] to explore and 
extract intruded data as well as 
hidden data for performing forensic 
analysis. 
Test data for the experimental investigation 
with the above tools was created on a 
Pentium (R) Core (TM) 2 Due CPU, 2.19 
GHz, 2.98 of RAM with Windows XP 
professional that adopts the NTFS file 
system partition. In this research, we focus 
on the boot sector of the NTFS disk image 
for the empirical study. We adopt the 
following three steps to perform digital 
forensic analysis III a comprehensive 
manner: 
i) Hard disk acquisition, 
ii) Evidence searching and 
iii) Analysis ofNTFS file system. 
2.1 Hard Disk Data Acq uisition 
In this step, we used the dcfldd developed by 
Nicholas Harbour and dd utility from 
George Gamer to acquire the NTFS disk 
image from the digital electronic storage 
devices since they are simple and flexible 
acquisition tools. The advantage of using 
these tools is that we could extract the data 
in or between partitions to a separate file for 
more analysis, and in addition, it provides 
built-in MD5 hashing features. Some of its 
salient features allow the analyst to 
calculate, save, and verify the MD5 hash 
values. In digital forensic analysis, using 
hashing technique is important to ensure 
data integrity and to identify whether the 
value of data has been changed as well as 
explore known data objects [19]. 
2.2 Evidence searching 
An evidence of intrusion could be gained by 
looking for some known signatures, 
timestamps as well as even searching for 
hidden data [20]. In this step, we used 
Strings command by Mark Russinovich, 
Frhed hexeditor tool by Rihan Kibria and 
WinHex hexeditor tool by X-Ways Software 
Technology AG to detect a keyword or 
phrase from the disk image. 
2.3 Analysis of NTFS File System 
The final step in the experimental 
investigation is to analyze the data obtained 
from the NTFS disk image that contribute 
towards meaningful conclusions of the 
forensic investigation. We adopted a 
collection of tools such as the Sleuth Kit 
(TSK) and Autopsy Forensic by Brian 
Carrier and NTFSINFO vl.0 from Microsoft 
Sysinternals by Mark Russinovich to 
perform different aspects of the NTFS file 
system analysis. 
3. Analysis of the boot sector of the 
NTFS disk image 
The first step for a digital forensic 
investigator is to acquire a duplicate copy of 
the NTFS disk image before beginning the 
analysis so as to ensure that the data on the 
original devices have not been changed 
during the analysis. Therefore, it is required 
to isolate the original infected computer to 
extract the evidence that could be found on 
the electronic storage devices from the disk 
image as the image captures the invisible 
information as well [21]. The advantages of 
analyzing disk images are that the 
investigators can: a) preserve the digital 
crime-scene, b) obtain the information in 
slack space, c) access unallocated space, free 
space, and used space, d) recover file 
fragments, hidden or deleted files and 
directories, e) view the partition structure 
and f) get date-stamp and ownership of files 
and folders [3, 22]. 
To understand how intrusions can lead to 
data hiding, deleting, etc. and to facilitate 
recovery, it is essential to understand the 
physical characteristics of the Microsoft 
NTFS file system. Master File Table 
(MFT) is the core of NTFS since it contains 
details of every file and folder on the volume 
and allocates two sectors for every MFT 
entry [23]. Each MFT entry has a fixed sized 
which is 1 KB (At byte offset 64 in the boot 
sector to identify the MFT record size). We 
provide the MFT layout and represent the 
plan of the NTFS file system using Figure 1. 
NTFS exists to read and write the attributes 
instead of read and write the file content. 
The MFT enables a forensic analyst to 
examine in some detail the structure and 
working of the NTFS volume. Therefore, it's 
important to understand how the attributes 
are stored in the MFT entry. 
Figure 1: MFT layout structure. 
MFT entry within the MFT contains 
attributes that can have any format and any 
size. Further, as it shows in Figure 1, every 
attribute contains an entry header which is 
allocated in the first 42 bytes of a file record, 
and it contains an attribute header and 
attribute content. The attribute header is used 
to identify the size, name and the flag value. 
The attribute content can reside in the MFT 
followed by the attribute header if the size is 
less than 700 bytes (known as a resident 
attribute), otherwise it will store the attribute 
content in an external cluster called cluster 
run (known as a non-resident attribute). 
This is because; the MFT entry is lKB in 
size and hence cannot fit anything that 
occupies more than 700 bytes. 
Metadata files are used to describe the file 
system. We created a NTFS disk image of 
the test computer using the dd utility and 
investigated the boot sector. We used 
NTFSINFO tool on the disk image as shown 
in Table 1 which shows the boot sector of 
the test device and information about the on-
disk structure: it enables you to view the 
MFT information, allocation size, volume 
SIze and metadata files. We extracted 
information such as the size of clusters, 
sector numbers in the file system, starting 
cluster address of the MFT, the size of each 
MFT entry and the serial number given for 
the file system. 
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Total sectors 
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: 991199 
: 123899 
o 1 2 3 6 7 
EE 52 90 4E 54 46 53 20 
00 00 00 00 00 F8 00 00 
00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 
04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
F6 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 
00 00 00 00 FA 33 CO 8E 
8E D8 E8 16 00 E8 DODD 
10 E8 53 00 68 DODD 68 
08 CD 13 73 05 E9 FF FF 
OF E6 D1 80 E2 3F F7 E2 
E7 C9 66 F7 E1 66 A3 20 
16 24 00 CD 13 72 OF 81 
74 04 FE 06 14 00 C3 66 
03 06 1C 00 66 3E 06 20 
00 66 50 06 53 66 68 10 
OF 85 OC 00 E8 E3 FF 80 
B4 42 8A 16 24 00 16 1F 
66 58 66 58 1F EB 2D 66 
66 F7 F1 FE C2 8A CA 66 
1A 00 86 D6 8A 16 24 00 
01 02 CD 13 OF 82 19 00 
FF 06 10 00 FF OE OE 00 
C3 AD F8 01 E8 09 00 AO 
: 106696 Free clusters 
Free space : 416 MB (86% of drive) 
Allocation Size 
Bytes per sector : 512 
Bytes per cluster : 4096 
Bytes per MFT record : 1024 
Clusters per MFT record: 0 
MFT Information 
MFT size : 0 MB (0% of drive) 
MFT start cluster : 41300 
MFT zone clusters : 41344 - 56800 
MFT zone size : 60 MB (12% of drive) 
MFT mirror start : 61949 
Meta-Data files 
Table I: NTFS Information Details. 
From the information gained above and from 
analyzing the boot sector image as shown in 
Figure 2, we performed an analysis of the 
data structure of this boot sector and this IS 
summarized in Table 2. 
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Figure 2: First Sector of the test boot Sector. 
Byte Size Description Vallie Range Note 
If bootable, jump. If non-
o -- 2 3 Jump to boot code 9458411 bootable, used to store error 
message 
3 -- 10 8 OEM Name - System ID NTFS 
11 -- 12 2 Bytes per sector: 512 
13 -- 13 1 Sectors per cluster 8 
14 -- 15 2 Reserved sectors 0 Unused 
16 -- 20 5 Unused 0 Unused 
21 -- 21 1 Media descriptor 0 
22 -- 23 2 Unused 0 Unused 
24 -- 25 2 Sectors per track 63 Not Check 
26 -- 27 2 Number of heads 255 Not Check 
28 -- 31 4 Unused 32 Not Check 
32 -- 35 4 Unused 0 Unused 
36 -- 39 4 Drive type check 80000000 For USB thumb drive 
40 -- 47 8 Number of sectors III file 
system (volume) 0.47264 GB 
48 -- 55 8 Starting cluster address of 4*8=32 $MFT 
Starting cluster address of MFT 
56 -- 63 8 Mirror 619,49 
$DA T A attribute 
64 -- 64 1 Size of record - MFT entry 210-1024 
65 -- 67 3 Unused 0 Unused 
68 -- 68 1 Size of index record 01h 
69 -- 71 3 Unused 0 Unused 
72 --79 8 Serial number C87C8h 
80 -- 83 4 Unused 0 Unused 
84 -- 509 426 Boot code ~ 
510--511 2 Boot signature OxAA55 
Table 2: Data structure for the test boot sector 
4. Analysis of the Hidden Data in 
the $Boot metadata file system 
Attackers use different techniques such as 
disguising file names, hiding attributes and 
deleting files to intrude the system. Since 
the Windows operating system does not zero 
the slack space, it becomes a vehicle to hide 
data, especially in $Boot file. Hence, in this 
study, we analyze the hidden data in the 
$Bootfile. The $Boot entry is stored in a 
metadata file at the first cluster in sector 0 of 
the file system called $Boot from where the 
system boots. It is the only metadata file that 
has a static location so that it cannot be 
relocated. Microsoft allocates the first 16 
sectors of the file system to $Boot and only 
half of these sectors contains non-zero 
values [3]. 
NTFS file system requires knowledge and 
experience to analyze the data structure and 
the hidden data [24]. The $Boot metadata 
file is located in MFT entry 7 and contains 
the boot sector of the file system. It contains 
information about the size of the volume 
clusters and the MFT. The $Boot metadat~ 
file has four attributes: 
$STANDARD INFORMATION 
$FILE _ NAME~ , 
$SECURlTY_DESCRlPTION and $DATA. 
The $STANDARD INFORMATION 
attribute contains temporal information such 
as flags, owner, security ID and the last 
accessed, written, and created times. The 
$FILE_NAME attribute contains the file 
name in Unicode, the size and 
information as well. 
$SECURITY _DESCRIPTION 
temporal 
The 
attribute 
contains information about the access 
control and security properties. Finally, the 
$DATA attribute contains the file contents. 
These are illustrated for the test sample as 
shown in Table 2 using the following TSK 
command tools: 
Istat -f ntfs c:\image.dd 7 
MFT Entry Header Values: 
Entry: 7 Sequence: 7 
$LogFile Sequence Number: 0 
Allocated File 
Links: I 
$STANDARD_INFORMATION Attribute Values: 
Flags: Hidden, System 
Owner ID: 0 
Created: Mon Feb 09 12:09:062009 
File Modified: Mon Feb 09 12:09:062009 
MFT Modified: Mon Feb 09 12:09:062009 
Accessed: Mon Feb 09 12:09:062009 
$FILE_NAME Attribute Values: 
Flags: Hidden, System 
Name: $Boot 
Parent MFT Entry: 5 Sequence: 5 
Allocated Size: 8192 Actual Size: 8192 
Created: Mon Feb 09 12:09:062009 
File Modified: Mon Feb 09 12:09:062009 
MFT Modified: Mon Feb 09 12:09:062009 
Accessed: Mon Feb 09 12:09:062009 
Attributes: 
Type: $STANDARD_INFORMATION (16-0) 
Name: N/A Resident size: 48 
Type: $FILE_NAME (48-2) Name: N/A Resident 
size: 76 
Type: $SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR (80-3) Name: 
NI A Resident size: 116 
Type: $DATA (128-1) Name: $Data Non-Resident 
size: 8192 
01 
Table 2: "$Boot Attributes" 
Hence the $Boot attribute of the NTFS file 
system could be used to hide data. By 
analyzing the hidden data in the boot sector, 
one could provide useful information for 
digital forensics. The size of the data that 
could be hidden in the boot sector is limited 
by the number of non-zero that Microsoft 
allocated in the first 16 sectors of the file 
system. The data could be hidden in the 
$Boot metadata files without ralSlng 
SUspICIon and without affecting the 
functionality of the system [25]. 
Analysis of the $Boot attribute of the NTFS 
file system will identifY any hidden data. 
The analyzer should start by making a 
comparison between the boot sector and the 
backup boot sector. The image with the boot 
sector and backup boot sector are supposed 
to be identical; otherwise there is some data 
hidden on the $Boot file. One method is to 
check the integrity of the backup boot sector 
and the boot sector by calculating the MD5 
for both of them. A difference in checksum 
indicates that there is some hidden data. We 
performed this comparison by adopting the 
following commands on the $Boot image 
file and the backup boot image, see the 
applied below: 
dd if=image.dd bs=512 count= 1 skip=61949 
of=c:\backupbootsector.dd -md5sum 
verifYmd5 -md50ut=c:\hashl.md5 
dd if=image.dd bs=512 count=l 
of=c:\bootsector.dd -md5sum -verifYmd5 -
md50ut=c:\hash2.md5 
We found that hidden data in the $Boot file 
was not detected directly by the tools used in 
this study and manual inspections were 
required alongside these forensic tools. 
Hence, through the analysis conducted with 
various utilities and tools, we arrived at the 
following results: 
1. There is a huge amount of data 
analysis required while scanning the 
entire NTFS disk image for forensic 
purposes. Just by focusing on the 
hidden data in the $Boot, this 
empirical study showed that many 
tools and utilities have to be adopted 
and it takes an immense amount of 
time to analyze the data derived. 
2. Not all computer infections are 
detected by forensic tools, especially 
intrusions that are in the form of 
hidden data in the $Boot file. 
3. By adopting a manual introspection 
of the $Boot file using the three-step 
approach of i) hard disk 
acquisition, ii) evidence searching 
and iii) analysis of the NTFS file 
system, we could identifY hidden 
data in the $Boot file. 
4. Searches can be performed to extract 
the ASCII and UNICODE characters 
from binary files in the disk image on 
either the full file system image or 
just the unallocated space, which 
could speed-up the process of 
identifYing hidden data. 
5. Microsoft has different versions of 
the NTFS file system. While 
Windows XP and Windows Server 
2003 use the same version, Windows 
Vista uses the NTFS 3.J version [7]. 
The new NTFS 3.1 has changed the 
on-disk structure. For example, the 
location of the volume boot record is 
at physical sector 2,048. Not all 
existing tools work with all the 
different versions of NTFS file 
system, hence a comprehensive tool 
is warranted even with the changes in 
the NTFS file structure. 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper has attempted to explore the 
difficulties involved in digital forensics, 
especially in conducting static analysis of 
NTFS disk images and propose a solution 
method. In this empirical study, we have 
found the boot sector of the NTFS file 
system could be used as a vehicle to hide 
data by computer attackers. This is an 
important NTFS file system weakness to be 
addressed as research in this domain area 
could lead to effective methods for the open 
problem of detecting new malicious codes 
that use this mode of attack. The existing 
forensic software tools are not competent 
enough to comprehensively detect hidden 
data in boot sectors. As a first step to 
address this problem, we have formulated a 
three-step forensic analysis process to 
facilitate the research methodology. We 
have reported the results gathered by 
adopting this process. One clear 
achievement through this research study is 
that we were successful in identifYing some 
unknown malicious hidden data in the $Boot 
file that were hidden from current well-
known virus scanners. The research 
methodology reported in this paper could be 
adopted to analyze other sectors of the NTFS 
file system as well. 
In this initial research investigation 
conducted, we had adopted a few forensic 
techniques and manual inspections of the 
NTFS file image. Our next stage of this 
research work would be to automate the 
proposed process so as to facilitate forensic 
analysis of the NTFS disk image in an 
efficient and comprehensive manner. We 
plan to extract signatures intelligently so as 
to detect efficiently new malware that use 
hidden and obfuscated modes of attack. 
This would help trigger more research to be 
conducted in satisfYing the objective of 
automatically and proactively identifying 
unseen malware that try to evade detection. 
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